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Long	read	|	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	are	in	a	particularly
weak	position	and	need	an	independent	authority	to
monitor	their	rights
The	Brexit	Withdrawal	Agreement	has	been	unveiled,	and	there	are	serious	limitations	to	the	future
protections	of	EU	citizens	living	in	Britain	after	Brexit.	As	things	stand	now,	EU	citizens	risk	falling
into	an	implementation	gap	created	by	the	limitations	to	bottom-up	enforcement,	and	the	limits	of
international	dispute	settlement.	In	this	blog,	Stijn	Smismans	(Cardiff	University)	argues	that	EU
citizens	in	the	UK	need	a	proper	independent	authority	to	monitor	their	rights.
On	19th	March	2018,	Michel	Barnier	and	David	Davis	proudly	presented	the	draft	text	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement
(WA)	which	had	most	of	the	document	coloured	as	green,	indicating	agreement	from	both	sides.		Although	each	part
of	the	text	remains	open	for	potential	revision	as	long	as	there	is	no	full	agreement	on	the	entire	text,	the	WA’s	part
on	citizens’	rights	appeared	to	be	considered	a	job	done.		However,	the	‘agreed’	text	is	far	from	guaranteeing	that	EU
citizens	in	the	UK	and	British	in	Europe	can	continue	their	life	as	it	is.	Some	rights	will	be	lost,	such	as	the	right	to
bring	in	a	future	foreign	spouse,	or	protection	against	expulsion	on	the	grounds	of	criminality,	and	freedom	of
movement	through	the	entire	EU	for	the	British	in	Europe.		For	the	EU	citizens	in	the	UK,	the	biggest	challenge	is
how	and	to	what	extent	the	WA	will	be	implemented	and	enforced.		As	the	UK	will	no	longer	be	part	of	the	EU,		the
enforcement	tools	traditionally	available	within	the	EU	are	no	longer	applicable.
Within	the	EU,	enforcement	of	EU	law	is	guaranteed	both	through	bottom-up	and	top-down	enforcement	tools.
	Bottom-up	enforcement	is	ensured	via	the	principles	of	direct	effect	and	supremacy,	which	allow	citizens	to	invoke
EU	law	directly	in	their	national	court.		Additionally,	the	preliminary	reference	procedure	allows	a	national	court	to
refer	to	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(CJEU)	when	there	is	doubt	about	the	proper	interpretation	of	EU	law.	Top-
down	enforcement	is	organised	via	the	infringement	procedure,	which	allows	the	European	Commission	to	take
Member	States	to	court	for	the	non-respect	of	EU	law.	If	a	Member	State	would	also	not	comply	with	the	decision	of
the	Court	of	Justice,	financial	sanctions	can	be	imposed.
The	British	citizens	in	Europe	would	still	be	able	to	rely	on	these	enforcement	tools	as	the	Member	State	they	reside
in	will	remain	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	CJEU.	However,	this	is	not	the	case	for	EU	citizens	in	the	UK.	The	draft
WA	provides	for	a	set	of	enforcement	tools,	partially	copying	existing	mechanisms	of	EU	law.	However,	its
enforcement	framework	still	leaves	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	in	a	particularly	weak	position.
The	EU	has	insisted	on	replicating	EU	bottom-up	enforcement	tools	in	relation	to	the	protection	of	citizens’	rights.	
Article	4	WA	confirms	that	the	UK	will	have	to	respect	the	direct	effect	on	the	citizens’	rights	provisions	of	the	WA.
Article	151	WA	also	allows	UK	courts	to	refer	to	the	CJEU	for	a	preliminary	ruling	in	case	of	doubt	on	the
interpretation	of	these	provisions.	However,	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	UK	will	properly	translate	Article	4WA
into	national	law.	David	Davis	has	made	confusing	statements	suggesting	that	the	mere	adoption	of	a	national
legislative	act	implementing	the	WA	would	equal	direct	effect	“if	you	like”.	However,	such	an	Act	would	need	to
include	a	specific	provision	recognising	the	direct	effect	of	the	WA	citizens’	provisions.		So	far,	the	Withdrawal	Bill	is
mute	on	the	matter	and	the	UK	has	not	made	an	explicit	statement	it	would	include	such	a	provision	in	a	WA
implementation	Act.
The	WA	itself	also	sets	a	limit	of	8	years	after	transition	on	the	possibility	of	preliminary	references	to	the	CJEU.		One
can	understand	this	compromise	given	the	UK’s	sensitivity	about	CJEU’s	involvement.	It	is	also	likely	that	most
interpretation	issues	of	the	WA	will	arise	during	the	first	years	of	implementation	of	the	WA,	and	in	particular	during
the	period	that	all	EU	citizens	will	need	to	register.	That	being	said,	the	time	limit	takes	away	future	protection	when
new	issues	arise,	e.g.	as	a	consequence	of	new	administrative	practice	or	legislative	initiatives	that	may	diverge	from
the	WA.
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Yet,	the	biggest	question	mark	about	bottom-up	enforcement	is	how	these	tools	will	be	applied	in	the	context	of	a
country	that	is	no	longer	a	Member	State.	The	effectiveness	of	direct	effect	and	supremacy	and	the	potential	reliance
on	preliminary	references	depend	on	the	extent	to	which	national	courts	and	public	administrations	have
appropriated	these	principles	and	consider	themselves	as	part	of	the	EU’s	judicial	system.	As	the	UK	will	be	out	of
the	EU,	national	actors	will	no	longer	perceive	themselves	as	part	of	the	EU’s	judicial	system,	and	it	remains	to	be
seen	to	what	extent	courts	and	administrations	will	be	inclined	to	apply	these	tools	just	for	the	implementation	of	the
citizens’	rights	provisions	of	the	WA.
As	‘bottom-up	enforcement’	might	thus	be	a	problem,	‘top-down	enforcement’	would	be	even	more	important.
Unfortunately,	the	WA	does	not	provide	continuation	of	the	infringement	procedure.	It	would	be	hard	to	imagine	the
UK	could	ever	accept	that.		Even	the	EU	has	never	explicitly	suggested	the	continuation	of	the	infringement
procedure,	although	its	initial	negotiation	positions	did	refer	to	monitoring	by	the	European	Commission.
The	WA	thus	refers	mainly	to	the	traditional	international	law	mechanism	of	monitoring	via	a	Joint	Committee.
However,	such	a	diplomatic	and	political	body	is	very	weak	compared	to	EU	top-down	enforcement.	To	give	the
enforcement	system	more	teeth,	Article	162	of	the	draft	WA	provides	that	issues	on	which	the	Joint	Committee
cannot	agree	can	be	brought	before	the	CJEU,	even	at	the	single	initiative	of	either	the	EU	or	the	UK.	However,	the
UK	has	not	yet	agreed	to	Article	162,	and	the	potential	for	judicial	action	following	disagreement	within	the	Joint
Committee	remains	open	for	discussion.
Even	if	Article	162	gets	approved,	the	dispute	settlement	mechanism	via	the	Joint	Committee	and	potential	recourse
to	the	CJEU	are	far	from	sufficient	to	deal	with	the	multiple	implementation	problems	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	are	likely
to	face.	Joint	Committees	provide	a	forum	to	discuss	systematic	problems	with	the	interpretation	of	an	international
agreement.	But	they	are	primarily	based	on	dialogue	and	compromise,	and	their	infrequent	meetings	stand	far	away
from	the	daily	practices	and	challenges	faced	by	individuals,	which	require	an	immediate	resolution.
EU	citizens	thus	risk	falling	into	an	implementation	gap	created	by	the	limitations	to	bottom-up	enforcement	as
explained	above,	and	the	traditional	limits	of	international	dispute	settlement.
Article	152	appears	to	intend	to	address	this	particular	implementation	void	in	the	UK	by	requiring	the	latter	to	set	up
an	Independent	Authority.	However,	the	way	this	Independent	Authority	is	defined	is	very	weak,	and	can	hardly	be
said	to	compensate	for	the	potential	problems	with	bottom-up	enforcement	and	the	absence	of	the	infringement
procedure.
Article	152	leaves	monitoring	and	enforcement	entirely	in	the	hands	of	the	UK.		There	is	no	guarantee	at	all	that	the
‘independent	authority’	will	at	any	stage	operate	independently.	The	recent	row	over	the	attempted	appointment	of
Toby	Young	as	a	member	of	the	Board	of	the	Higher	Education	Regulator	is	a	fresh	reminder	of	how	the	government
intends	to	control	assumed	independent	authorities.	Given	the	political	context,	it	is	highly	unlikely	there	is	any
chance	this	independent	authority	will	be	allowed	to	operate	independently	if	the	UK	government	has	entire	freedom
to	define	the	parameters	of	setting	up	such	an	authority.
The	UK	is	asked	here	to	monitor	itself	on	rules	it	has	signed	up	to	because	of	international	bargaining,	not	because
of	it	believes	in	a	particular	policy	for	which	it	is	convinced	that	an	independent	authority	would	provide	the	best
outcome.		Its	political	priority	of	reducing	immigration	means	it	has	mainly	an	incentive	to	make	the	independent
authority	as	weak	as	possible	and	closely	under	control	of	the	government.	As	Article	152	is	framed	now,	it	is	most
likely	that	appointees	to	the	‘independent’	authority	will	share	government	views	and	operate	under	government
control,	while	the	Authority	will	most	likely	be	badly	resourced.
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The	only	solution	to	ensure	that	the	Authority	will	be	adequately	independent	and	can	compensate	for	the
‘implementation	gap’	is	that	it	be	set	up	as	a	joined	EU-UK	institution	and	embedded	within	the	international
commitments	of	the	WA.
It	makes	little	sense	to	leave	monitoring	of	an	international	agreement	to	the	sole	initiative	of	the	party	that	has	the
least	interest	to	ensure	such	monitoring.	Hence,	instead	of	Article	152	requesting	the	UK	to	set	up	an	independent
authority,	the	WA	itself	should	create	it.	Alternatively,	a	Protocol	attached	to	the	WA	could	set	out	its	features	in	more
detail.
Such	an	Independent	Authority	could	take	the	following	form:
Composition:	to	ensure	the	independence	of	the	authority	and	its	link	to	the	international	guarantees	provided	by
the	WA,	the	organisational	design	cannot	be	merely	national.	The	way	European	agencies	are	set	up	can	be	an
inspiration	here.	The	Authority	could	be	composed	of	a	Board,	Director	and	administration.	The	Board	of	the
Independent	Authority	should	be	composed	of	independent	experts	appointed	on	the	basis	of	their	expertise,	half	of
whom	appointed	by	the	UK,	half	by	the	EU.	The	Board	could	also	include	civil	society	organisations	operating	in	the
field	(as	is	the	case	for	several	European	agencies).	The	Board	would	set	out	the	general	policy	of	the	Independent
Authority	and	appoint	its	Director.	This	appointment	procedure	would	ensure	that	the	Director	can	operate
independently	from	the	Government.
The	Director	would	be	responsible	for	the	daily	running	of	the	Authority	and	would	be	supported	by	an	administration
(many	of	whom	with	legal	training).	Administrative	staff	would	be	appointed	by	the	Director	on	the	basis	of	their
expertise.
Budget:	the	only	way	to	ensure	that	the	Authority	would	have	a	proper	budget	to	play	its	role	is	by	requiring	co-
financing	UK-EU	on	an	equal	basis.
Powers:	Article	152	gives	the	Authority	the	power	to	receive	and	investigate	complaints	from	Union	citizens	and	their
family	members,	and	to	conduct	inquiries	on	its	own	initiative.	However,	Article	152	only	mentions	breaches	by
administrative	authorities.			It	is	not	clear	whether	this	includes	(directly	or	indirectly)	issues	where	legislation
breaches	the	citizens’	provisions	of	the	WA.		In	case	it	does	not	cover	legislative	action,	Article	152	leaves	a	big
lacuna,	compared	to	infringement	procedure	within	the	EU.	To	address	this,	the	Independent	Authority	should	be
able	to	monitor	also	whether	legislation	respects	the	WA.
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The	current	formulation	of	the	WA	also	remains	vague	on	how	the	Independent	Authority	can	use	its	inquiries.	It
states	that	it	should	have	the	right	to	take	the	issue	to	the	competent	UK	court	or	tribunal.	It	is	important	that	an
appropriate	legal	remedy	is	available	for	that.	Moreover,	it	is	preferable	that	the	WA	is	more	prescriptive	in	giving	the
Authority	explicit	decision-making	power	or	at	least	the	power	to	make	recommendations	to	authorities	breaching	the
WA,	with	the	subsequent	option	to	go	to	court	if	they	do	not	comply	with	the	decision.
It	is	also	important	to	strengthen	the	link	between	monitoring	by	the	Independent	Authority	and	political	monitoring
provided	by	the	Joint	Committee.	Article	152	(2)	states	that	the	Independent	Authority	should	report	annually	to	the
Joint	Committee.	This	allows	assessing	annually	the	overall	implementation	at	a	diplomatic	level.	Yet,	given	the
potential	limitations	to	bottom-up	enforcement,	the	WA		should	also	provide	the	opportunity	for	the	Independent
Authority	to	trigger	a	meeting	of	the	Joint	Committee	whenever	it	deems	this	necessary.	It	is	important	to	create	a
direct	link	between	operation	on	the	ground	and	possibility	to	trigger	political	action	for	serious	systematic	breaches
via	the	Joint	Committee,	and	potential	subsequent	judicial	action	via	the	CJEU.	This	is	particularly	the	case	for
legislative	action	not	respecting	the	WA,	or	if	national	courts	fail	to	implement	the	WA	properly.
Sunset	clause:	Article	152(3)	states	that	the	Joint	Committee	can	allow	the	UK	to	abolish	the	Authority	after	8	years.
This	sunset	clause	was	not	in	the	Commission	draft	of	the	WA,	but	was	subsequently	introduced	at	the	request	of	the
UK.		However,	this	leaves	EU	citizens	in	a	particularly	weak	position	for	the	future,	especially	as	also	CJEU
involvement	(via	preliminary	rulings)	will	fall	away	at	the	same	time.
Given	the	limits	of	bottom-up	enforcement	tools	and	international	dispute	settlement,	the	Independent	Authority	is
likely	the	most	central	mechanism	to	ensure	proper	implementation	of	the	WA.	It	should,	therefore,	be	properly
enshrined	in	the	WA	as	an	EU-UK	institution	and	its	role	should	not	be	limited	in	time.
The	WA	is	still	not	set	in	stone.	The	Commission,	and	in	particular	the	Member	States	and	the	European	Parliament
can	still	revise	the	text	and	do	what	is	required	to	protect	EU	citizens	properly.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Stijn	Smismans	is	Professor	of	Law	at	the	School	of	Law	and	Politics	and	Director	of	the	Centre	for	European	Law
and	Governance	at	Cardiff	University.
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